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Insurance Law. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus
Ins. Co., 668 A.2d 647 (R.I. 1995). Coverage is triggered under a
general liability "occurrence-based" insurance policy when prop-
erty damage manifests itself, is discovered or in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence is discoverable.
Insurers commonly predicate policy coverage on the occur-
rence of an act during the policy period.1 Under such policies cov-
erage is provided if an insured event takes place within the policy
period, regardless of when a claim is filed. However, these policies
often provide nettlesome questions as to whether the event did oc-
cur within the policy period.
In CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. 2, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court was asked to determine at what
point a triggering occurrence took place under an occurrence-based
excess-liability insurance policy where a chemical spill occurred in
1974, but damage was not detected until 1979. 3 The insurance pol-
icy at issue only covered the plaintiff company for occurrences in
1979 through 1980.4 The court reasoned that the occurrence that
triggered policy coverage took place when the contamination was
detected in 1979 rather than when the spill immediately occurred. 5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 21, 1974, a massive chemical spill occurred in Cum-
berland, Rhode Island at Peterson/Puritan, an aerosol-packaging
plant and former subsidiary of plaintiff CPC International, Inc.
(CPC).6 No immediate damage to the well fields that fed the mu-
nicipal water supplies of the towns of Cumberland and Lincoln was
detected.7 However, in October 1979 both towns discovered chemi-
cal contamination in their water supplies and the wells were sub-
sequently shut down.8
1. Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law § 5.10(d)(1) (1988).
2. 668 A.2d 647 (R.I. 1995).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 650.
6. Id. at 647-48.
7. Id. at 648.
8. Id.
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In 1982 the town of Lincoln (Town) and the Board of Water
Commissioners of Lincoln (Board) sued Peterson/Puritan for con-
tamination of the water supplies. This suit was ultimately settled
between the town, Board and CPC's primary insurer, Northwest-
ern National Insurance Company (Northwestern). 9 Northwestern
subsequently notified CPC and CPC's excess-liability insurer,
Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance Co. (Northbrook) that
coverage under its $1 million policy was exhausted. 10
CPC sued Northbrook in 1987 in New Jersey state court for a
declaration that Northbrook must indemnify CPC for cleanup costs
and other damages incurred."' The case was removed to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and was then trans-
ferred to the United States District Court for Rhode Island in 1989
where it was tried.1 2 Ultimately the question of whether CPC had
shown an occurrence within the policy period was certified to the
Supreme Court 13 pursuant to Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The United States District Court for Rhode Island granted summary
judgment in favor of Northbrook on the theory that the pollution exclusion clause
contained in the policy precluded coverage under New Jersey law. CPC Int'l, Inc. v.
Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 759 F.Supp. 966 (D.R.I. 1991). The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded. CPC Intl, Inc. v. Northbrook
Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1992). On remand the district
court applied Rhode Island law to the dispute because of a change in New Jersey
choice of law provision and decided that since Rhode Island courts have not con-
strued the language "sudden and accidental" the question must be decided by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. 839 F.Supp. 124 (D.R.I. 1993). The district court
held that under "general principles of insurance law" the appropriate trigger the-
ory was at the point when the aquifer was actually damaged. CPC, 668 A.2d at
648. The court of appeals affirmed, but found the law of Rhode Island unclear with
respect to trigger-of-coverage issues and certified the question to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court under Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CPC Intl, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 1211 (1st Cir.
1995).
13. The certified question asked:
What trigger-of-coverage standard would the Rhode Island Supreme
Court use for determining at what point an 'occurrence' causing 'property
damage' took place, within the meaning of the insurance policy provisions
provided in the separate opinion in this case, where an insured alleges
that a spill of hazardous contaminants in 1974 migrated through the
groundwater, causing immediate injury to the pertinent property, which
was not, in fact, discovered, however, until at least 1979?
CPC, 668 A.2d at 647.
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Appellate Procedure. 14 The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed
that no prior opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court provided
guidance. 15
BACKGROUND
Typically insurers issue policies that predicate coverage on an
"occurrence-based" basis or a "claims-made" basis. 16 The latter
method requires that an insured file a claim for recovery within
the policy term.17 The former insists that a triggering act occur
within the policy term. 18 Because of the difficulty inherent in de-
termining when a coverage triggering event has occurred in many
environmental disaster cases,1 9 it has been suggested that courts
will follow one of several theories of trigger to decide when an oc-
currence took place.20
Prior to its decision in CPC, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
had not adopted a particular trigger theory as a statement of
Rhode Island law. Previously, in Bartholomew v. Ins. Co. of North
America,21 the United States District Court for Rhode Island had
14. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. App. P. 6.
15. CPC, 668 A.2d at 649.
16. See Textron, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 639 A.2d 1358 (R.I. 1994); Rich-
ard C. Tinney, Annotation, Event as Occurring within Period of Coverage of "Oc-
currence" and "Discovery" or "Claims Made" Liability Policies, 37 A.L.R. 4th 382,
390 (1985).
17. Textron, 639 A.2d at 1361 n.2; Tinney, supra note 16, at 390.
18. Tinney, supra note 16, at 390; See also St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 535 n.3 (1978) (distinguishing occurrence-based and claims-
made policies).
19. Several commentators have noted this difficulty. See e.g., Jerry B. Ed-
monds, et al. Trigger of CGL Coverage in the Environmental Context: Perspective of
Insurers' Counsel, 28 Gonz. L. Rev. 523, 524 (1993) ("In environmental coverage
cases, the time period between the first release of pollutants and the clean up of a
site may be quite long, covering several policy periods. Thus, the question often
arises as to which of a series of policies, if any, is triggered.").
20. One commentator has suggested four theories: 1.) the exposure theory,
which triggers coverage when the property covered is exposed to the damage caus-
ing element; 2.) the manifestation theory, which triggers coverage when the prop-
erty becomes reasonably capable of being discovered; 3.) the continuous or multiple
trigger theory, which triggers those policies in effect from the time of exposure
through manifestation, and; 4.) the injury-in-fact theory which triggers coverage at
the time the actual property damage occurred. Edmonds, supra note 19, at 525.
The author distinguishes application of these theories from allowing the factfinder
to simply apply the policy language to the facts of the case. Id. See also, CPC, 46
F.3d at 1219-22 (1st Cir. 1995) (describing various trigger of coverage theories).
21. 502 F. Supp. 246 (D.R.I. 1980).
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decided that a liability triggering occurrence takes place when the
insured knew or reasonably should have known of the damage. 22
However, because the Rhode Island Supreme Court had never
before addressed this issue, or approvingly cited Bartholomew,
that case was of little guidance in assessing Rhode Island law.23
And while in Textron24 the Rhode Island Supreme Court had men-
tioned occurrence-based policies in a footnote,25 the helpfulness of
this footnote in indicating the trigger-theory adopted by Rhode Is-
land26 was dubious at best. Thus, the case law leading up to CPC
was unclear and the time was ripe for the issue of trigger of cover-
age to be addressed by Rhode Island's highest court.
ANALYSIS
In CPC, the Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that
its case law did not provide guidance to the certified question. CPC
argued that the triggering contamination occurred it was discov-
ered that when the chemicals reached the wells in 1979.27 Con-
versely, Northbrook argued that the occurrence took place prior to
1979, pointing to evidence that Peterson/Puritan employees had
dumped chemicals into the drains and septic systems of the plant
prior to 1979 and alternatively urging that the occurrence took
place in the year of the spill.28 The court acknowledged the availa-
bility of various theories of trigger, citing the theory proposed in
Bartholomew where the district court held that coverage was trig-
gered when the insured knew or reasonably should have known of
the damage, and looking at the wrongful act theory, the injury-in-
fact theory and the exposure theory.
The court then examined the exact wording of the policy.29 It
reasoned that under the policy an "occurrence" cannot occur with-
out "property damages" and that such damages did not occur until
22. Id. at 254.
23. CPC, 46 F.3d 1211, 1221 (discussing Bartholomew and questioning its va-
lidity as an indicator of Rhode Island law).
24. Textron, 639 A.2d 1358.
25. Id. at 1361 n.1.
26. CPC, 46 F.3d at 1221-22 (calling the footnote dictum and ambiguous).
27. CPC, 668 A.2d at 648.
28. Id.
29. The policy defined "property damage" as a "[1loss of or direct damage to or
destruction of tangible property (other than property owned by any insured) and
which results in an Occurrence during the policy period." CPC, 668 A.2d at 649.
It defined "occurrence" as
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the damages were discovered or manifested themselves. Thus, an
occurrence could not take place under the policy until
manifestation.
In construing the insurance contract as it did, the court ap-
provingly looked to two decisions decided by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, 30 both of which have been identified as examples of the
manifestation theory.3 1 In Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty
Mutual Inc. Co., the court of appeals construed language similar to
that present in CPC and decided that the policy distinguished be-
tween an accident and damage and that it was the actual damage
that was the triggering event. 32 The court went on to hold that the
policy was triggered when asbesteosis became clinically evident or
reasonably capable of medical diagnosis. Similarly, in American
Home Assurance Co. v. Libby-ovens-Fund Co., the court of appeals
adopted the theory that an occurrence took place when a "reason-
able person would be aware that a defect exists that may give rise
to a cause of action."33
Following the analysis of these decisions the court in CPC im-
plicitly adopted a manifestation theory by holding that "coverage
under a general liability policy is triggered by an occurrence that
takes place when property damage, which includes property loss,
manifests itself or is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence is discoverable." 34
[A]n accident, event or happening including continuous or repeated expo-
sure to conditions which results, during the policy period, in Personal In-
jury, Property Damage or Advertising Liability neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the Insured.
Id.
30. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 682 F.2d 12
(1st Cir. 1982) and American Home Assurance Co. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786
F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1986).
31. CPC, 46 F.3d at 1220; Edmonds, supra note 19, at 540-43.
Other examples of the manifestation theory in the environmental context in-
clude Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986)
(coverage is not triggered by the release of chemicals but by the result of damage);
Hartford County v. Hartford Mutual Insurance Co., 610 A.2d 286 (Md. 1992).
32. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 24.
33. American Home, 786 F.2d at 30.
34. CPC, 668 A.2d at 650.
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CONCLUSION
In CPC, the Rhode Island Supreme Court appears to have
adopted the manifestation theory for answering questions of trig-
ger of coverage. This theory has been described as analytically
similar to the discovery rule in the statute of limitations context.
When loss manifests itself in a way that is discovered or reason-
ably discoverable under an occurrence-based insurance policy, cov-
erage has been triggered.
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Insurance Law. Mallane v. Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 18
(R.I. 1995). A named insured's sibling, listed as driver on a decla-
rations page of insurance policy, is treated as "insured" entitled to
uninsured motorist coverage.
By enacting the Uninsured Motorist Statute1 the legislature
intended that protection be given to named insureds against eco-
nomic loss or injuries resulting from the negligent operation of un-
insured motor vehicles. 2 In Mallane v. Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co.,3 the
court held that the listing of a driver's name on the declarations
page gave rise to an ambiguity as to which drivers were covered,
because a typical subscriber would believe that named drivers
were covered insureds. Accordingly, the named sibling was deter-
mined to be a named insured entitled to uninsured motorist
benefits. 4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Defendant, Holyoke Mutual Insurance, (Holyoke) issued an
automobile policy to plaintiff's brother, Gregory Mallane, as the
"named insured" set forth on the declaration page, for the policy
period February 15, 1992 to August 15, 1992. The other individual
named on the declaration page was the plaintiff, Anthony Mallane
(Plaintiff). The policy also contained a heading entitled "driver's
name." Under this heading, both Anthony and Gregory Mallane
were listed. Apparently, Plaintiff's name was placed on the decla-
ration page at the request of the agent for the insurance policy.
This listing of Plaintiff did not, however, increase the policy
premiums. 5
On March 13, 1992, Plaintiff sustained severe personal inju-
ries while riding as a passenger in a vehicle operated by James W.
Donahue. Donahue's vehicle was uninsured, and consequently,
Plaintiff claimed uninsured-motorist benefits under the policy is-
sued to Gregory Mallane. 6 Thereafter, Holyoke refused to pay
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.1 (1979).
2. Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 259 A.2d 408, 413 (R.I. 1969); Malo v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 459 A.2d 954, 956 (R.I. 1983).
3. 658 A.2d 18 (R.I. 1995).
4. Id. at 21.
5. Id. at 19.
6. Id.
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Plaintiff's claim and Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action
against Holyoke in superior court.7
The superior court granted Plaintiff's summary judgment mo-
tion, holding that he was an insured because he was listed as a
driver on the declarations page of the policy. 8 The issue on appeal
was whether Plaintiff was entitled to uninsured-motorist coverage
under the insurance policy. 9
BACKGROUND
The Uninsured Motorist Legislation was enacted so that, as a
matter of public policy, protection would be given to the named in-
sured against economic loss resulting from injuries sustained by
reason of the negligent operation of uninsured motor vehicles or
hit-and-run motor vehicles.' 0 It has been held that the primary
object of the uninsured legislation is to indemnify the insured's loss
rather than defeat his claim.'" As such, in reaching their decision,
the court was faced with a presumption of coverage in favor of
Plaintiff.12
In 1994, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was faced with a
similar situation in Lehroff v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Com-
pany.13 In Lehroff, the declarations page of an automobile policy
listed the plaintiff as a driver, and the definition of "covered per-
son" mirrored the policy at issue in this matter. 14 "Although the
plaintiff in Lehroff did not fit the definition of a "covered person"
under the policy, he was entitled to recover under uninsured mo-
torist coverage because he was listed as a driver on the declara-
tions page."' 5 Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated
that a "typical automobile policyholder would understand and ex-
pect from the declarations page of this policy that each of the listed
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 20.
10. Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 259 A.2d 408 (R.I. 1969); Malo v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 459 A.2d 954 (R.I. 1983) (interpreting R.I. Gen. Laws. § 27-7-2.1
(1979)).
11. Ditata v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 542 A.2d 245, 247 (R.I. 1988); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 27-7-2.1 (1979).
12. Mallane, 658 A.2d at 20; see also, Aldroft, supra note 11; Ditata, supra
note 12.
13. 638 A.2d 889, 892-893 (N.J. 1994).
14. Mallane, 658 A.2d at 21 (citing Lehroff, 638 A.2d at 891).
15. Id. (citing Lehroff, 638 A.2d at 891-893.)
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drivers was entitled to all of the coverages and all of the protec-
tions afforded by the policy."16
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
Initially, the court, utilizing traditional rules of insurance pol-
icy construction, stated that in order to determine whether an in-
surance policy is ambiguous, the policy is read in its entirety,
giving words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. 17 Secondly,
if insurance policy terms are ambiguous or capable of more that
one meaning, the policy will be strictly construed in favor of the
insured and against the insurer.' 8
In Mallane, the court concluded that the listing of the drivers'
names on the declarations page, without more, gives rise to an am-
biguity in respect to whether such drivers are in fact covered under
the terms of the policy. 19 Having concluded that the policy was
ambiguous, the court next determined that the trial court properly
construed the contract and, in doing so, gave the words their plain
and ordinary meaning while resolving all ambiguities against the
insurer.20 Finally, the court, relying upon public policy, stated
that the reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declara-
tions page cannot be contradicted by the policy's boilerplate lan-
guage unless the declarations page itself clearly warns the insured
party.21
16. Id. (quoting Lehroff, 638 A.2d at 893.)
17. Aetna Casualty & Sur. v. Sullivan, 633 A.2d 684, 686 (R.I. 1994); Amica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Streicker, 583 A.2d 550, 551-552 (R.I. 1990); Bush v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 448 A.2d 782, 784 (R.I. 1982); Nagy v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
219 A.2d 396, 398 (R.I. 1966); Gleason v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 589 F.Supp.
1474, 1481 (D.R.I. 1984) (court will not employ "mental gymnastics" in order to
find ambiguity in policy where none is present).
18. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Sullivan, 633 A.2d 684, 686 (R.I. 1993); Bartlett
v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 45, 47 (R.I. 1991); Bush v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 448 A.2d 782, 784 (R.I. 1990).
19. Mallane, 658 A.2d at 20; see Sentry Ins. Co. v. Grenga, 556 A.2d 998, 999
(R.I. 1989) (ambiguity in policy where term "underinsured coverage" used on decla-
rations page was not mentioned or defined in policy or in "plain talk" pamphlet).
20. Mallane, 658 A.2d at 21.
21. Id.; see also Elliot Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (R.I.
1977) (holding that an "ordinary reader," in the face of such detail, would be war-
ranted in concluding that any significant limitation on collision insurance would
have been explicitly noted).
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CONCLUSION
In as much as this case is one of first impression for Rhode
Island, it is of substantial significance to state insurance law prac-
titioners. The court sets out how "covered person" and "named
drivers" relate on uninsured motorist coverage questions. In
adopting a decision based upon well-settled laws of policy construc-
tion as well as public policy, the court held that a reasonable per-
son would assume coverage under the facts presented and, as such,
a driver listed on the declarations page is "insured" and entitled to
uninsured motorist coverage.
Joseph T. Healey
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Insurance Law. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 653 A.2d 70 (R.I.
1995). Loss-payee clause in an automobile insurance policy enti-
tled secured lender to recover under policy for theft of automobile,
despite the fact that the insured misrepresented the true state of
ownership of vehicle.
Prior to Peerless Ins. Co. v. Doyle,' the Rhode Island Supreme
Court had declared that with respect to insurance policies, namely
fire insurance policies, that a loss-payee clause creates a separate
agreement between an insurance company and a mortgagee. 2 In
Peerless, the court was to determine whether the loss-payee clause
entitled a secured lender to recover under a policy for the theft of
an automobile when the insured misrepresented the true state of
ownership of the vehicle. The court held that, despite the misrep-
resentation, the secured lender was entitled to recovery under the
clause.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Paul and Doris Doyle were the named insureds in an insur-
ance policy provided by the Peerless Insurance Company (Peer-
less). 4 The policy covered inter alia losses for fire and theft.
During the coverage period, the subject vehicle was stolen from the
Lincoln Mall while under the control of Gregory Doyle (the son of
the named insured), who was not named in the policy.5 Appar-
ently, Paul and Doris Doyle had concealed Gregory's interest in the
automobile when obtaining the policy from Peerless. 6
Thereafter, Peerless sought declaratory judgment from the su-
perior court, seeking to deny recovery under the policy issued to
the Doyles and Citizen Savings Bank ("Citizens") as loss payee7
because of the misrepresentations made by the named insureds in
applying for the policy. Citizens moved for summary judgment re-
1. 653 A.2d 70 (R.I. 1995).
2. Greater Providence Trust Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 355 A.2d
718 (R.I. 1976); Old Colony Co-Op Bank v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 332 A.2d
434 (R.I. 1975).
3. Peerless, 653 A.2d at 71.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. It was undisputed that Citizens had financed the purchase of the auto-
mobile and was not party to any misrepresentation made by the named insured.
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lying upon the loss-payee clause contained in the insurance policy,
which provided that the rights of the loss-payee should not become
invalid because of the insured's fraudulent acts or omissions.8 The
superior court granted Citizens' motion and Peerless appealed.
The issue presented on appeal was whether the loss-payee clause
entitled Citizens, a secured lender, to recover under a policy for the
theft of an automobile when the insured misrepresented the true
state of ownership of the vehicle.
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Greater Providence Trust
Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. declared that with respect to
fire insurance policies, a loss-payee clause created a separate
agreement between the insurance company and a mortgagee. 9
In Greater Providence Trust, the Apex Auto Body, Inc. ("Apex")
owned an apartment house located in Coventry.10 The apartment
house served as the headquarters of Apex's business and was sub-
ject to a first mortgage held by Centreville Savings Bank ("Centre-
ville") and a second mortgage which had been given to the Greater
Providence Trust Company ("Greater Providence").11 The first
mortgage was granted on June 4, 1969, and in September of 1970,
Nationwide Insurance ("Nationwide") issued its fire policy on the
premises listing Centreville as mortgagee. 12 Greater Providence's
mortgage was executed on October 19, 1970.1.
In September of 1971, a fire destroyed a portion of the apart-
ment house. 14 Nationwide covered the fire loss by paying Apex. 15
Thereafter, Apex went into receivership and the controversy arose
as to whether Nationwide should have paid Centerville as mortga-
gee, instead of Apex.16 Subsequently, Centreville transferred its
mortgage and note to Greater Providence an action to recover the
amount lost which Nationwide had paid Apex, notwithstanding the
8. Peerless, 653 A.2d at 71.
9. Greater Providence Trust Co. vi Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 355 A.2d
718 (R.I. 1976).
10. Id. at 719.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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standard mortgagee clause in the policy. 17 The supreme court held
that the insurer was entitled to rely on a one year limitation in the
insurance policy and that the conduct of the insurer in negotiating
with the assignee did not estop the insurer from relying on the
limitation. 18
Similarly, in Old Colony Co-Op Bank v. Nationwide Mut. Inc.
Co., 19 an action was brought by the mortgagee directly against the
fire insurer after a fire destroyed the mortgaged real property. The
supreme court held that the statutory mortgagee notice require-
ment gave rise to a separate contract between the mortgagee and
the insurer as well as the mortgagor and the insurer. 20 These two
cases provided the requisite authority from which the court af-
firmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of Citizens. 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court, in reaching their decision, stated that:
the public-policy principles involved in the foregoing
cases are similar to those in respect to an agency or
institution that has provided financing for the
purchase of an automobile and who is named as loss
payee in such policy. Consequently, we believe that
those cases are persuasive in resolution of the in-
stant controversy. 22
Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior court's granting of
summary judgment and held that Citizens, as loss payee, may re-
cover under the policy for theft of the automobile despite the fact
that the purchasers of the policy may have misrepresented the
true state of ownership of the vehicle. 23
CONCLUSION
While the state legislature has regulated the relationship be-
tween the loss payee and the insurer in fire insurance policies, no
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 322 A.2d 434 (R.I. 1975).
20. Id. at 436.
21. Greater Providence Trust Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 355 A.2d
718 (R.I. 1975); Old Colony Co-Op Bank v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 332 A.2d
434 (R.I. 1975).
22. Peerless, 653 A.2d at 71.
23. Id.
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such regulation existed for automobile policies. The supreme
court, in holding that the loss-payee clause entitled the secured
lender to recover under the policy for the theft of an automobile
despite the insured's misrepresentations, addressed this gap con-
cerning the loss-payee and insurer relationship.
Joseph T. Healey
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Insurance Law. Whitehouse v. Rumford Property and Liab. Ins.
Co., 658 A.2d 506 (R.I. 1995). Superior Court lacks discretion to
permit late claim against Insurers' Insolvency Fund Act.
The Insurers' Insolvency Fund Act1 was passed in order "to
provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims under cer-
tain insurance policies . . . because of the insolvency of an in-
surer .. "2 In Whitehouse v. Rumford Property and Liab. Ins.
Co., 3 the Rhode Island Supreme Court was asked to determine
whether the superior court properly exercised discretion to allow
Sprint Systems of Photography to file a claim beyond the bar date.
The court held that the language of the statute was unambiguous
and clearly evidenced a legislative intent to exclude any claim filed
after the bar date. Accordingly, the court reversed the superior
court's order stating that the court lacked discretion to permit a
late claim.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Rumford Property and Liability Company (Rumford) provided
multiperil insurance to Sprint Systems of Photography (Sprint) on
an occurrence basis from September of 1989 through September of
1990.5 On June 18, 1990, the superior court entered a decree de-
claring Rumford insolvent and canceling all service contracts as of
July 18, 1990.6 The court also ordered each creditor and claimant
to file a written statement of any claim against Rumford with the
appointed receiver by June 18, 1991. 7
In November of 1992, Jill Englehardt (Englehardt) brought an
action against Sprint, alleging that she sustained personal injuries
in November of 1989, during the period Sprint was covered by the
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-34-2 (1994) states:
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a mechanism for the pay-
ment of covered claims under certain insurance policies to avoid excessive
delay in payment and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders
because of the insolvency of an insurer, and to create an entity to assess
the cost of such protection and distribute it equitably among member
insurers.
2. Id.
3. 658 A.2d 506 (R.I. 1995).
4. Id. at 509.
5. Id. at 507.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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occurrence policy." Sprint received notice of Englehardt's suit for
the first time in April of 1993 and forwarded notice to its agent.
Thereafter, the agent forwarded notice to Rumford, in receiver-
ship, on May 5, 1993. After Rumford forwarded notice to the insol-
vency fund on May 13, 1993, the insolvency fund declined coverage
on the basis that the time for filing had expired on June 18, 1991. 9
When the receiver declined coverage for the claim, Sprint peti-
tioned the superior court.10 The insolvency fund intervened, and
along with the receiver, objected to the petition.11 "After a hear-
ing, the superior court granted Sprint's petition in October of 1993,
more that two years after the original bar date of June 18, 1993."12
The issue, one of first impression for the court, was whether the
superior court abused its discretion in allowing Sprint to file a
claim beyond the bar date when Rhode Island General Laws sec-
tion 27-34-8(a)(1)(iii) specifically prohibits any such late claim.13
BACKGROUND
The purpose of the Insurers' Insolvency Fund Act 14 is to pro-
vide a means for the payment of claims under certain insurance
policies and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders
due to the insolvency of an insurer.' 5 Furthermore, the act creates
an entity to assess the cost of this protection and to distribute it
among member insurers. 16 However, as the court in Whitehouse
later held, such protection requires a degree of finality. 17
Other jurisdictions with similar insolvency statutes have held
that their courts lack jurisdiction to allow out-of-time claims.' 8
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
.12. Id.
13. Id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-34-8(a) (iii) (1994) states, in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a covered claim shall
not include any claim filed with the fund after the final date set by the
court for the filing of claims against the liquidator or receiver of an insol-
vent insurer.
14. R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-34-1 et seq. (P.L.1970, ch. 166 § 1; P.L.1988, ch. 407,
§ 1).
15. R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-34-2 (1994).
16. Id.
17. See infra text and accompanying notes.
18. See eg., Kinder v. Pacific Public Carriers Co-op, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 657,
663-664, 164 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (1980)(court holds third party liability claim
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These decisions hold that although an insolvency act serves to
eliminate risk for policyholders of doing business with an insolvent
insurer, "there must be some degree of finality to the liquidation
proceedings." 19 Otherwise, the allowance of claims after the set
bar date would "unnecessarily prolong distribution of the insolvent
insurer's assets to the detriment of other claimants and the guar-
anty association."20
ANALysis AND HOLDING
The court's final decision rested upon their construction of the
statute and their determination of legislature's intent regarding
the Insolvency Act. The particular section to be construed, Rhode
Island General Laws section 27-34-8(a)(1)(iii), provides: "Notwith-
standing any other provisions of this chapter, a covered claim shall
not include any claim filed with the fund after the final date set by
the court for the filing of claims against the liquidator or receiver of
an insolvent insurer."
The court in reaching its decision, followed well settled rules of
statutory construction, effectuating the intent of the legislature by
examining the statute in its entirety and giving words their plain
and ordinary meaning. 21 Furthermore, the court stated, that
when a statute is plain and clear, no interpretation by the court is
required. 22
From the clear language of the statute, the court held that
there was "an unambiguous legislative intent to exclude any claim
after the bar date."23 Accordingly, the court rejected the argu-
ments of Sprint and the Receiver because they contradicted the
against insurer could not be extended beyond statutory deadline); Satellite Bowl,
Inc. v. Michigan Prop. & Cas. Guar. Assoc., 165 Mich. App. 768, 771-72, 419
N.W.2d 460, 462 (1988)(property and casualty guaranty association is obligated to
accept only timely filed claims); Jason v. Superintendent of Insurance, 67 A.D.2d
850, 850-851, 413 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (1979)(physician not entitled to order deeming
late proof of claim to be timely filed nunc pro tunc as of deadline); Lake Hosp. Sys.,
Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assoc., 69 Ohio St. 3d 521, 524-26, 634 N.E.2d 611, 614-15
(1994)(Ohio Insurance Guaranty Association has no discretion to entertain claims
filed after final date set for filing in liquidation proceeding).
19. Whitehouse, 658 A.2d at 508 (quoting Satellite Bowl, 419 N.W.2d at 462).
20. Id. (quoting Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 634 N.E.2d at 615).
21. In re Falstaff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d 1047, 1049 (R.I. 1994).
22. Krupa v. Murray, 557 A.2d 868, 869 (R.I. 1989).
23. Whitehouse, 658 A.2d at 508.
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clear terms of the statute. 24 As such, there existed no basis upon
which the superior court could exercise discretion under its equita-
ble powers or under Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 6(b)25 to permit a claim to be filed beyond the bar date of
June 18, 1991.26
Consequently, notwithstanding the fact that the purpose of
the act is to avoid financial loss because of the insolvency of the
insurer,2 7 the court was forced to give effect to the clear legislative
intent of Rhode Island Gen. Laws section 27-34-8(a)(1)(iii), which
prohibits any claim from being filed after the bar date.28 Thus, the
superior court lacked discretion to permit a claim against the insol-
vency fund when that claim was filed out of time. 29
CONCLUSION
This case was one of first impression for the Rhode Island
Supreme Court. Its holding, that a judge's equitable powers do not
include the discretion to allow a late claim under the insolvency
fund, will be of some consequence to Rhode Island insurance law
practitioners. The court's conclusion was in accordance with well
settled laws of statutory construction, and similar views have been
adopted in several jurisdictions.
Joseph T. Healey
24. Id.
25. Id.; R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 6(b) states:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time,
the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or
without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefore is
made before the expiration of the period orginally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of
the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was
a result of excusable neglect or (3) permit the act to be done by stipulation
of the parties; but it may not extend the time for taking action under
Rules 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), 60(b), and 73(a) [repealed] except to the
extent and under the conditions stated in them.
26. Whitehouse, 658 A.2d at 508.
27. R.I. Gen.Laws § 27-34-2 (1994).
28. Whitehouse, 658 A.2d at 509.
29. Id.
1996] 307
